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By Democratic Audit
Debating Scotland’s transition costs: A response to Iain
McLean’s critique
Iain McLean’s welcome comments can help us to see more clearly where some real uncertainties lie,
says Patrick Dunleavy. Underneath the flim-flam of debate, the scope of debate about transition costs has
focused down.
Credit: the Scottish Government, CC BY NC 2.0
I am very grateful to Iain McLean for responding critically and perceptively to our reportabout the possible
transition costs for Scotland in the event of Yes vote in the referendum with his clear and interesting comments.
Both of us clearly believe that voters in Scotland should have the best possible basis for making their decision,
and Iain’s querying of our analysis is very helpful in further exploring and clarifying the issues involved.
I guess it would be most helpful for readers at this stage to highlight what are the key differences between Iain’s
view and mine, and to show how they might be reconciled, which is what my Table 1 below does, for each
component of the costs in dispute. It also shows how we can reconcile the apparent differences between us.
Table 1: Key differences between the Dunleavy and McLean views of Scotland’s transition costs, and how
they might be reconciled
Type of cost Dunleavy view (PD) McLean view (McL) Reconciliation
Initial set-up costs
£200 million
Based on study of Whitehall
reorganizations and detailed analysis
of list of UK bodies affected
McL is sceptical – but upon
what basis is unclear. The
Scottish Office Secretary
accepted these numbers on
TV, saying he had no rival
numbers to offer.
There is always
room for
uncertainty in
cost estimating
– but generally
some numbers
are better than
no numbers
Disentangling
costs
Borne by both Scotland and rUK.
Scotland’s share could be ½ to 1/12
(population share) depending wholly
on negotiations
Argues that these are also
set-up costs. Quotes UK
Treasury extrapolating high
disentangling costs – basis
unclear. Silent on share of
cost allocated to Scotland
This is a dispute
about language.
Streamlining
savings
Mentioned – previous intra-UK
reorganizations have generated
substantial savings
Ignored This is a scope
difference
Transition costs
from inter-
governmental
agreement or
contracting
between Scotland
and rUK
Points out some (modest) additional
costs will accrue here and says that
contracting would be most expensive
option. Depends on negotiations
Says that PD ignores these
costs
Mistake by McL
Cost to Scotland of
gaining full control
of its own tax
system by 2020s,
replacing old,
complex ‘legacy’ IT
with modern
systems
Says Treasury published informal
estimate of £500 million is not based
on any careful analysis, but is ‘not
implausible’. This number has no
provenance and there is no detail
behind the guesstimate. Costs will
depend a lot on negotiations
Presumably accepts Treasury
number? Argues that no
reinvestment cost would be
needed without Scottish
independence having taken
place, so full amount = ‘set up’
cost. Silent on negotiations.
This is a dispute
about language.
Cost to Scotland of
gaining full control
of its own benefits
system by 2018,
replacing old,
complex ‘legacy’ IT
with modern
systems
Says Treasury published but informal
estimate of £400m is not based on
any careful analysis, but is ‘not
implausible’. This number has no
provenance and there is no detail
behind the guesstimate. Costs will
depend a lot on negotiations
Presumably accepts Treasury
number? Argues that no
reinvestment cost would be
needed without Scottish
independence having taken
place, so full amount = ‘set up’
cost. Silent on negotiations.
This is a dispute
about language.
Policy savings Discussed Not mentioned This is a scope
difference
Asset transfers Discussed – warning that any sums
received for unfixed or overseas
assets should not be thought of as
offsetting transition costs, but as part
of Scotland’s public equity backing
up borrowing
Not mentioned This is a scope
difference
In addition, going beyond our report, Iain’s comment introduces an extensive discussion of two reports from ICAS
(the Institute of Chartered Accountants for Scotland) dwelling on the issues involved in the transition of the
taxation system. I summarize our different views of the relevance and quality of these reports below in Table 2.
Table 2: Different views of two ICAS reports
ICAS report Dunleavy view (PD) McLean view
(McL)
Reconciliation
The tax
implications of
Scottish
independence or
further
devolution
Discussed briefly. PD says: “ICAS have produced
a long academic report dwelling in a rather vague
way on the complexities of running a tax system.
But with a stable UK tax regime in place in the
country for many decades, and plenty of strong
expertise for the Scottish government to draw on,
there seems every reason to believe that
Scotland’s revenue stream will continue as
before. Indeed ‘tax morale’ (the willingness of
citizens or businesses to pay taxes) is likely to
rise after independence.”
Unclear This is a commissioned
report from a set of
English law
academics, covering
both
independence anddevo
max changes. There
are actually no
transition cost numbers
at all given in this
report. We agree that it
sets out the well-known
(and perfectly general)
issues that shape
whether a tax system
runs successfully or
not.
ICAS, Scotland’s
tax future;Taxes
explainedPress
release
Not mentioned because:
a. ICAS number is 50 per cent more than Treasury number
b. The ICAS number actually has no relevant provenance – it is a number taken from New Zealand costs for a
different reform, and is not based on any discernible specific analysis of Scotland’s situation.
c. The NZ reform referred to actually introduced a Mirrlees-type tax system there. ICAS says that the Scottish
government has indicated a willingness to go down a Mirrlees optimal reform route. But no such policy decisions
have been made by any Scottish government at this time. If they were made, in the five years following another
general election and a new government’s formation, Scotland would be buying a wholly reformed tax system, not
a replacement system. Ergo these costs cannot conceivably be represented as set-up costs.Assigns strong
credence to ICAS number on the basis of trusting Scottish accountants generally. He does not explain why the
Treasury number above (that he also accepts) is so much less than this.It would be good to know what number Ian
is actually advocating – currently his two endorsed numbers are very far apart.
Note: The 2011 Mirrlees Report was to the UK government (named after economist James Mirrlees). It set out
moves to bring the UK tax system closer to economists’ idea of an optimal tax system, see here. A complete and 
thorough-going reform, designed to last for generations, it has not yet been implemented.
Where does this leave us on estimating the total transition costs that Scotland would face? Table 3 gives a
summary view and shows how the different positions that Iain and I take can be reconciled.
Table 3: Differing views of Scotland’s total transition costs estimates
Dunleavy view (PD) McLean view
(McL)
Reconciliation
£200 million immediately, +
Scottish share of disentangling
costs, + investments costs for tax
and benefits back office of
perhaps as much as £900
million, minus streamlining
savings, minus policy costs.If we
count roughly half of investment
costs as necessitated by
independence then net transition
costs would be less than £650
million
At least £200 million
immediately, +
Scottish share of
disentangling costs,
+ alleged further
‘set-up’ costs for tax
and benefits back
office of £900
million to £1,150
million. Total
transition costs of
up to £1.5 million
The Treasury quoted a review study by Prof Robert
Young of Canada saying that government transition
costs could reach 1.1 per cent of GDP. On this basis
the Treasury and Danny Alexander have repeatedly
stressedtransition costs of £1.5 billion costs as the
UK government’s key estimate. However, Professor
Young has himself disowned this interpretation of his
work. He has stressed thatthe estimates he reviewed
lie on a range. The bottom of this range was 0.4 per
cent of GDP, about £600 million for Scotland.
Iain does a good job of essentially restating, almost word for word, the UK government’s position. He also
endorses (in his usual agreeable and folksy way) the unionist campaign’s highly contentious use of the language
of ‘set up costs’, but he does recognize the difficulties of cost estimation.
It is interesting to note in this context that a main reason why costs numbers are currently hard to estimate is that
Whitehall has been completely forbidden by ministers from calculating any detailed transition costs for Scotland,
in case some numbers get written down that could be FoI-ed and then undermine the ‘Better Together’ campaign.
Equally civil servants have been banned from even discussing any of the transition details in advance with
Scottish government staff. To my knowledge, the only London body that has had any more detailed discussion
with Edinburgh is the Bank of England (which is independent of ministers). Compare this treatment with the civil
service briefings normally given to all parties before a UK general election. Why should the far more important
issues around possible independence be left for Scottish voters to conjecture about like this, when detailed
answers could easily be made available either by Whitehall or by academics commissioned to inform the debate?
Conclusions
Overall, however, I welcome the fact that behind some debating points in Iain’s piece that I don’t want to engage
with, Table 3 shows that the scope for discussion about transition costs has clearly focused down. Scotland’s
voters can be relatively sure that total transition costs over a decade will lie in a restricted range, from 0.4 of one
per cent of GDP (£600 million), up to a maximum of 1.1 per cent (£1,500 milion). This is a step forward in debate
and I am grateful to Iain for helping to bring it out.
In place of the earlier atmosphere of dread about transition that was being encouraged by some unionist
statements, perhaps both sides in Scotland debates can now ‘lighten up a wee bit’  about transition costs – and
debate instead the real issues of principles, values and future choices that separate them.
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